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Abstract
In this paper, the interplay between various competing orders among 
three ethnic groups on the margins of the Ethiopian state that have 
overlapping presence along the Ethiopia-Kenya border is analysed. 
The paper probes into complex and intertwined causes of inter-group 
conf licts by going beyond the commonly asserted resource scarcity and 
ethnicity assumptions, arguing that any attempt to establish sustainable 
peace becomes futile without assessing inter-group conf lict within a 
context including historical, environmental, political, economic, cultural 
and institutional dimensions. The paper also conceptualises the state as 
an active player in inter-group relations, as it plays a fundamental role in 
instigating and/or resolving conf licts based on its political, economic and 
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strategic interests. Taking the case of inter-group conf licts among three 
groups inhabiting border areas along southern Ethiopia and northern 
Kenya, and by employing actor-oriented perspectives, the paper argues 
that the involvement of competing interests and claims on the side of the 
Ethiopian state, local communities and individuals, both in the instigation 
of conf licts and peacebuilding processes further complicates the situation. 
It concludes that inter-group conf lict and attempts at peacebuilding in 
the region are to a large extent inf luenced by national political dynamics, 
changes in traditional institutions and cross-border relations.  
Keywords: Inter-group conf lict, peacebuilding, competing orders, 
Ethiopia-Kenya border.
Introduction
Inter-group conf licts in pastoralist and agro-pastoralist regions of eastern 
Africa have increasingly become the defining features of the region, 
causing major humanitarian, security and political challenges to states 
and local communities. In this regard, the southern Ethiopia and northern 
Kenya pastoral frontiers are typical examples of areas where conf lict has 
become recurrent with a convergence of complex and multi-layered actors 
and causes (Bassi 2010; Oba 2013). Although there is no major divergence 
on the consequences of such conf licts in terms of humanitarian crisis, 
political instability and economic impacts, there is no consensus among 
researchers and policy makers on the causes of conf licts and the actors 
involved, as well as on peacebuilding processes. 
Ascribing inter-group conf licts in post-colonial Africa to ethnicity and 
resource scarcity is the dominant feature of literature on conf lict studies, 
political science and international relations (Dunn 2001; Zeleza 2008). 
The resource scarcity theory was built on positivist epistemological 
thinking and posits that there is paucity of natural resources and 
an irrational competition among people to gain maximum access. 
This continues to be a predominant discourse in conf lict studies of pastoral 
and agro-pastoral regions in developing countries (Hagmann 2005:3). 
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In fact, from a rational choice theory and entitlement perspectives, 
pastoralist and agro-pastoralist communities’ exertion of different 
strategies in utilising common resources can be interpreted as a systematic 
and rational approach for human-environment interactions (Bogale and 
Korf 2007:746). Likewise, some scholars (and the western media) try to 
attribute conf lict in Africa to primordial and instrumentalist notions of 
ethnicity (Dunn 2001:51). Invariably, ethnicity and resource competition 
are interconnected factors; with ethnic identity – a socially constructed 
phenomenon – inf luencing people’s perceptions about their rivals while 
scarcity of resources at their disposal eventually instigates conf lict between 
ethnic groups (Azarya 2003). These theses will be analysed in detail later 
in this paper.
In contrast, there are emerging scholarly works that question these 
perspectives, arguing that while ethnicity and resource scarcity are salient 
factors in inter-group conf lict, a comprehensive understanding of such 
conf licts demands an in-depth analysis of the complex interplay between 
actors, interests and strategies. This is because, for ethnicity and resources 
to cause conf lict, there would be an actor or force that mobilises people 
and changes their perception on their identity vis-à-vis others, resource 
availability, ownership, utilisation right and governance. Hence, it is the 
volatility of ethnicity that can be activated by ethnic entrepreneurs for 
different purposes, and the activation of people’s perceptions of their 
resources that both act as potent forces in reactivating past inter-ethnic 
antagonisms (Hagmann 2005; Regassa 2010, 2012a). 
This paper argues that inter-group conf licts in Africa, including the 
recurrent conf licts on the margins of the Ethiopian state along the 
Ethiopia-Kenya border are caused by a complex interplay of factors and 
the involvement of actors, and should not be just reduced to ethnicity 
and resource scarcity. Preconceived assumptions about ethnicity and 
resource scarcity as the predominant causes of inter-group conf licts are 
regarded as too reductionist, and as a too simplistic starting point for 
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planning peacebuilding mechanisms. Moreover, the presence of competing 
institutions with different approaches to conflict resolution further complicates 
the situation.
The paper also addresses the complexity of conf lict factors and actors in 
inter-group conf licts and the predicament of peacebuilding in such regions. 
This is done through the analysis of the notion of competing orders. 
This refers to contradictions in conf lict research involving epistemological 
perspectives, multi-layered actors and institutions. The Ethiopia-Kenya 
borderland is an interesting scene because it is a frontier where three ethnic 
groups – Borana, Gabra and Garri – transcend national boundaries both 
in terms of settlement and of kinship relationships. Moreover, the border 
town of Moyale, on the Ethiopian side, is contested between different 
actors ranging from local rival groups to regional states and the federal 
government. This paper considers the state as an active agent in instigating 
conf licts, and also a self-proclaimed negotiator based on its political, 
geopolitical and economic interests. That is why understanding conf lict 
and peacebuilding processes in such a context demands a more nuanced 
contextual analysis of the complex interplay of actors, institutions, 
historical narratives, local and national political dynamics, and cross-
border relations.
Data for this paper was collected through intensive fieldwork conducted 
from July to December 2015 in southern Ethiopia and northern Kenya. 
However, this paper does not claim to dwell on cross-border conf licts. 
Rather, it focuses on conf licts on the Ethiopian side of the border but 
integrates data from northern Kenya for information on mobilisation of kin 
groups across the national border during conf lict and conf lict resolution. 
While in-depth interviews and focused group discussions were used as 
methods of data collection, grounded theory was used during the data 
generation, categorisation and analysis process because as Emerson and 
others (2010) argue, it enables us to create categories and assemble concepts. 
The subjects involved in this research are members of traditional 
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institutions, local elders, local government officials, cross-border traders 
and members of local communities from the three groups (Borana, Gabra 
and Garri). 
The paper is divided into three sections. The section that follows presents 
the context of the study, arguing that the contested frontier should be 
discussed in the light of historical, geographical and political contexts. 
In the second section, competing orders and narratives related to pastoralist 
conf licts are critically evaluated, deconstructing the notions of ethnicity 
and resource scarcity and discussing the state as an active player in conf lict 
and in peacebuilding. In the third section, by identifying key actors and 
causes in the conf lict, the paper analyses challenges to building sustainable 
peace in the region. The last section gives a brief conclusion. 
Producing the context
The study area straddles both sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border and 
provides unique features containing not only diverse ethnic groups 
and identities but also overlapping cultural repertoires transcending 
the geographical boundaries of two countries. On the Ethiopian side, 
the Borana, Gabra and Garri live side by side though their territorial 
possessions have been f luid across time (Oba 2013:215–216). The Gabra 
and Borana speak the Oromo language and are among the groups making 
up the broader Oromo nation. According to the post-1991 political and 
administrative reordering of Ethiopia along ethno-linguistic lines, the 
two groups form the Borana zone in the Oromia national regional state 
(Adugna 2009). The Garri, however, are part of the Somali clans who have 
progressively been expanding to Borana land since early 20th century (Bassi 
2010:228) and currently live in the Somali national regional state as well as 
in the Borana zone. These three groups also live on the Kenyan side of the 
border in counties such as Moyale, Marssabet, Isiolo and Sololo.
In terms of livelihood engagements, all of these groups are pastoralists and 
thus rangeland, water wells and customary institutions regulating inter-
personal and societal relations, human-environment interactions and 
rangeland management remained crucial among all of them (Tache and 
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Oba 2009; Bassi 2010). In the past, these communities shared resources and 
resolved conf licts through customary institutions where inter-group and 
trans-boundary relations were carefully negotiated on the basis of local 
customs, traditions and reciprocity embedded in their culture, institutions 
and rituals. 
Source: Adugna 2009, with permission.
According to Adugna (2009), rather than being a constraint to inter-group 
interactions, national borders serve as economic, political and cultural 
resources for kin groups across different sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border 
during conf lict, conf lict resolution and political mobilisation, and at times 
of drought and other forms of natural or human induced crisis. Conversely, 
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the strategic geopolitical and economic importance of the border between 
the two countries made it one of the contested spaces among many actors 
including the federal state, Oromia national regional state, Somali national 
regional state, the three groups, and settlers who are engaged mainly in 
informal cross-border trade.
In terms of livelihood engagements, all of these groups are pastoralists and 
thus rangeland, water wells and customary institutions regulating inter-
personal and societal relations, human-environment interactions and 
rangeland management remained crucial among all of them (Tache and 
Oba 2009; Bassi 2010). In the past, these communities shared resources and 
resolved conf licts through customary institutions where inter-group and 
trans-boundary relations were carefully negotiated on the basis of local 
customs, traditions and reciprocity embedded in their culture, institutions 
and rituals. 
According to Adugna (2009), rather than being a constraint to inter-group 
interactions, national borders serve as economic, political and cultural 
resources for kin groups across different sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border 
during conf lict, conf lict resolution and political mobilisation, and at times 
of drought and other forms of natural or human induced crisis. Conversely, 
the strategic geopolitical and economic importance of the border between 
the two countries made it one of the contested spaces among many actors 
including the federal state, Oromia national regional state, Somali national 
regional state, the three groups, and settlers who are engaged mainly in 
informal cross-border trade.
This region has already been a serious test to Ethiopia’s ethnic federalism 
due to frequent outbreaks of inter-ethnic and inter-group conf licts that 
required intervention by the federal government – as was evident in the 
call for a referendum in Oromia and Somali national regional states in 
2004 (Tache and Oba 2009; Bassi 2010). Beginning from the early 1990s, 
the Borana-Somali conf lict on the Ethiopian side of the border claimed 
the lives of many people, and led to cattle rustling, displacement of people 
and destruction of property (Abbink 1997; Clapham 2002). Because of 
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territorial claims involving many villages in some districts of the Borana 
zone and Somali region, the federal government arranged a referendum in 
2004 on the arguable principle of minimum majority (i.e. 50% plus one) – 
leaving out substantive issues relating to historical, cultural and economic 
variables that the competing groups brought forward (Bassi 2010:235). 
For example, in May and June 2015, conf lict erupted between the Gabra 
and Garri over territorial claims as a result of the Somali’s establishment of 
a new village under the Liban zone but crossing into the Borana territory 
that the Gabra use for grazing. Although there was no historical evidence 
showing Garri’s territorial possession of and settlement in the currently 
contested village, the group, backed by the federal government in Addis 
Ababa, has continuously been expanding into Borana land. The federal 
police force intervened and temporarily stopped the conf lict, but the 
situation seems to be waiting for just another igniting factor in the future. 
According to a Gabra elder from the contested village called Laga Suree, 
the conf lict is purely a result of the Somali’s territorial expansion on the 
one hand and the Borana zone’s lack of autonomy to defend its territory on 
the other hand:
In the past, the three groups lived together, sharing resources without any 
problem. But now, after this issue of kilil [region] came, those in kilil 5 
[Somalis] are continuously expanding to our land, taking portions of 
villages and establishing their own new villages. All these villages over there 
were our land. The Garri people came to this place very recently. They were 
supported by the government and took our land. Whenever we appeal to 
the Borana zone and Oromia region, they say it is beyond their authority 
pointing out that the federal government handles such issues. But the 
federal government does not respond (Anonymous informant, Laga Suree 
village, August 2015).
What is striking about inter-ethnic conf lict in the region is the ease with 
which the conf lict escalates across the border because of strong cross-
border cultural, identity and economic ties between kin groups on both 
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sides of the border. In 2012 for example, conf lict erupted between Borana 
and Gabra in Marssabit county of Kenya mainly due to contested claims 
and competition among local politicians following the constitutional 
devolution in the country. As a result, nearly 20 000 people crossed the 
border into Ethiopia while dozens lost their lives (Oromia Times 2012). 
Although the Borana and Gabra coexist in relative harmony in Ethiopia, 
the conf lict on the Kenyan side of the border affected the level of trust and 
coexistence between those in Ethiopia as well. As informants from both 
groups in Moyale district in Ethiopia affirmed, members of the two groups 
crossed the border into Kenya to fight on the side of their kin during the 
conf lict, which directly affected inter-group relations at home (in Ethiopia). 
Competing narratives about pastoralist conflicts 
Understanding competing epistemological contradictions in conf lict 
research and situating discussions on peacebuilding within complex 
power relations between various actors gives us the insight to move beyond 
deterministic and reductionist approaches that tend to treat inter-group 
conf licts as driven by resource scarcity and ethnicity. By interjecting 
empirical data from the field, three epistemological f laws in the debate 
on inter-group conf licts among the three communities have readily been 
exposed and analysed. First, this paper deconstructs the epistemological 
basis for the direct correlation of resource scarcity and conf lict, and argues 
for multi-dimensional interpretations of conf licts. Second, it scrutinises 
the ‘ethnicity’ factor because ethnicity as a social relation by itself is not a 
cause of conf lict. Rather, it can be a potent force used in the mobilisation 
of ethnic groups (Regassa 2010:100). Third, when situated within the 
centre-periphery debate, literature on inter-ethnic conf licts in Ethiopia 
rarely consider the state as an important actor in the conf lict at local levels. 
An understanding of these three perspectives is capable of aiding a better 
comprehension of the conf lict dynamics and peacebuilding processes. 
Indeed, the aim of this paper is to consider the state, pursuing its own 
interests, as a f lexible actor both in conf lict as well as in peacebuilding. 
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Built on the conventional positivist approach in investigating cause-
effect relations between resource scarcity and inter-group conf licts, early 
works on conf lict studies attributed local tensions, clashes, violence and 
war in developing countries to competition over resources (Homer-Dixon 
1994). According to this notion, resource scarcity linked to climate change 
and population pressure constitutes the fundamental cause of conf lict 
in developing countries, including Africa (Homer-Dixon 1994; Zeleza 
2008). Homer-Dixon (1994:24) further connects inter-group conf lict to 
resource competition because the control of natural resources would give 
the conf licting actors the leverage to inf luence political and economic 
situations in the contested areas. Likewise, Azarya (2003:3) asserts, 
‘We regard conf lict as endemic, a natural order of things as long as scarcity 
of resources exists’. This argument further reiterates that as long as scarcity 
is acute with critical consequences to resource users, conf lict becomes 
inevitable and difficult to manage.
Such an assertion is, however, too reductionist and f lawed. Firstly, it reduces 
complex causes of inter-group conf licts to resource scarcity, thereby 
trivialising the local people’s ability and skill in negotiating and adapting 
to changing environmental conditions. Secondly, it is based on simplistic 
cause-effect relationships without probing into how local processes are 
inf luenced by extra-local forces, phenomena and actors (Hagmann 2005; 
Tache and Oba 2009). Moreover, the assumption detaches the biophysical 
environment from the cultural environment and thus constrains us from 
understanding how ‘conf licts are emerging and developing on the basis 
of the meaning and interpretation people involved attach to actions and 
events’ (Hagmann 2005:19). Such a deterministic notion of population 
growth, resource scarcity and social strife also does not indicate empirical 
reality, particularly in pastoralist parts of the study area. The fact that 
Ethiopia’s pastoralist regions, including those along the Ethiopia-Kenya 
border, are sparsely populated and have a very low population growth rate, 
but do experience recurrent conf licts refutes the association of conf lict 
with population growth. In addition, in the past the groups managed 
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and regulated their rangeland through traditional customary institutions 
within the context of scarcities (Legesse 1973; Bassi 2010). Therefore, the 
assumption does not have strong empirical ground because the people 
maintained peace even under circumstances of resource scarcity in 
the past. 
The second major gap in the literature on inter-ethnic conf licts in Africa is 
related to the fixation on ethnicity as a key trigger of conf lict. Inf luenced 
by western academia and the media, particularly after the early 1990s in 
the context of major inter-ethnic conf licts and wars in different parts of 
Africa, some scholars consider both the primordialist and instrumentalist 
notions of ethnic identification as major triggering factors for inter-ethnic 
conf licts (Azarya 2003). However, such fixation on the binary perspectives 
related to resource greed and ethnicity has actually made it difficult to 
understand discursive aspects of conf lict in which different actors with 
various levels of power relations, interest and network are visibly or 
invisibly involved (Dunn 2001:51).
In the context of Ethiopia as well, many scholarly works emphasise the 
ethnicity factor for post-1991 inter-ethnic conf licts in the country, arguing 
that ethnic federalism has reactivated dichotomies and antagonisms, and 
administrative and resource boundaries have taken ethnic dimensions 
(Abbink 1997; Schlee 2003; Berisso 2009). While this argument is valid, 
its fundamental weakness is its assumption of conf lict as a direct result 
of ethnicity without probing into the complex factors behind it. However, 
according to previous empirical studies regarding conf licts between the 
Guji and Gedeo, and between the Guji and Burji in southern Ethiopia, for 
instance, ethnicity was not a cause of the conf licts in both cases; but ethnic 
dichotomies were reactivated for mobilisation of the society during the 
conf licts (Regassa 2012a, 2012b). That is why understanding the national 
political discourse, local inter-ethnic relations and the role of actors in the 
conf lict is imperative to gaining comprehensive insights into inter-ethnic 




This perspective was emphasised by a key informant from the Gabra 
community in Moyale district of Ethiopia who associates inter-group 
conf licts with what he considers ‘people in the politics’ rather than 
ethnicity. According to the informant, government authorities have been 
working on polarisation of ethnic differences rather than building on 
historical and cultural commonalities.
The third fundamental point that limits the understanding of inter-ethnic 
conf licts, particularly in pastoralist areas, is the failure to recognise the 
state as an active actor in conf lict, conf lict resolution and peacebuilding. 
From an actor-oriented perspective, Bryant and Bailey (1997) and Long 
(2001) argue for positioning the state as an active actor in development 
intervention, environmental degradation and conf lict. As a rejoinder to 
the environmental scarcity-conf lict hypothesis, Peluso and Watts (2001:7) 
argue for the deconstruction of any consideration that the state is a 
neutral mediator in inter-ethnic conf licts because economic and political 
interests of government authorities complicate conf licts and make conf lict 
resolution and peacebuilding difficult. Further, from the political ecology 
perspective, Robbins (2012) brings up issues of power and discourse, 
and how major actors including the state play active and invisible games 
to control environmental resources, territories and spaces, thereby 
exacerbating conf lict. 
In the case of Ethiopia, apart from reconfiguring administrative structures 
along ethno-linguistic lines, the post-1991 experiment with ethnic 
federalism has redefined traditional resource utilisation and management 
strategies in pastoralist regions along ethnic-based territorialisation. 
This is in contradiction with the pastoralists’ customary regulations and 
rangeland management strategies (Tache and Oba 2009:422). By redefining 
physical boundaries and activating ethnic boundaries, the formal 
institutionalisation of ethnicity as a mobilising force brought latent elements 
of dichotomies and antagonisms between former friends, while sometimes 
bringing former enemies together in alliance (Berisso 2009). Moreover, 
the empirical data from the Borana, Gabra and Garri communities showed 
the federal government’s partiality in the management of inter-group 
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relations. According to interviewed Borana elders from Moyale district, the 
federal government considers them as its enemies because the Garri and 
sometimes the Garba give false information alleging the Borana youth to 
be members of the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF). As a result, the federal 
government sides with the Somalis as a mechanism of punishing the 
Borana. A key informant from the Garri community in Moyale town also 
indirectly confirmed the Borana elders’ complaint against government’s 
lack of impartiality, stating that the Borana shelter the rebel group and 
that it would not be possible to ensure peace in the region unless they stop 
sympathising with what the elders call the shifta (rebels).
These sentiments echo the concern that the federal government has, since 
the withdrawal of the OLF from the transitional government in 1992, been 
very cautious in dealing with the Oromos (Clapham 2002). In other words, 
the fact that the OLF and the Borana belong to the broader Oromo nation 
has put the Borana at a disadvantage in their relations with the federal 
government. They have, in significant ways, become victims of the national 
political dynamics – being sidelined by the federal government on questions 
of territorial rights and access to customary resources. Therefore, the state 
remains the central actor in igniting inter-ethnic tensions, using its power 
for systematic control of the society.
Multiple actors, causes and the predicaments of 
peacebuilding in the region
In terms of categorising actors, the state (still heterogeneous and with 
varying degrees of interest), traditional institutions, local communities, 
NGOs, and other individuals engaged in cattle rustling and theft, and 
smugglers were found to be the major actors in the conf lict. All these actors 
subscribe to different perspectives of causes and claims of entitlement 
and advance various understandings of peace. While the state and local 
communities practise conf lict resolution initiatives using their own 
approaches, various NGOs try to play the role of bridging the state-society 
rift and at times try to bring the two together. Beyond the resource scarcity 
thesis, therefore, this paper found multiple causes of the conf lict, broadly 
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categorised into political, economic, cultural, geographical and identity 
issues. These two aspects of the conf lict – multiple actors and multiple 
causes – together complicate the peacebuilding process and exacerbate 
conf licts, and will thus be analysed below.
The duality of the Ethiopian State in the conflict
Beginning from the colonial period, both the British and Ethiopian imperial 
rulers had competing geopolitical and economic interests in the wider 
Horn of Africa that made pastoral communities victims of predatory state 
systems for much of the colonial era, and after (Schlee 2003; Oba 2013). 
This is because of the states’ extractive approaches of resource exploitation 
and due to the dominant notions of denigrating pastoralist modes of 
livelihood as backward (Behnke and Kerven 2013). On the Ethiopian side, 
pastoralist groups have long been considered as security threats to successive 
regimes in the country because of their cross-border relations, their 
inhabiting of peripheral regions which the state considers as ungoverned, 
and their easy access to firearms (Hagmann and Mulugeta 2008). 
The state is, of course not monolithic. If anything, it maintains a variety of 
interests, and institutions, and is constituted of individuals who subscribe 
to different values, cultures, religions, gender perspectives and so on. 
As Migdal (2001) argues in his notions of entanglement of state in society, 
the conventional perspective considering the state as constitutive of 
uniform perspectives and interests is misleading. Similarly, Long (2001) 
clearly explains cases where different state institutions advance different 
interests. The state is constitutive of internally heterogeneous entities that 
one way or another compete, contest, negotiate and come to terms based 
on interests, power relations, agencies and networks within and beyond its 
heterogeneous structures and individuals (Bryant and Bailey 1997; Long 
2001). In this regard, the Ethiopian state could be seen from three different 
levels in the context of this study: as the federal state, the Oromia national 
regional state, and the Somali national regional state.
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Before interrogating the roles of the state in conf lict and conf lict resolution 
in the region, it is important to brief ly discuss the historical roots of 
contradictory competing orders between the Ethiopian state at the centre 
and its peripheries. The centre-periphery relation echoes how contrasting 
worldviews are produced, institutionalised and communicated (Donham 
2002; Markakis 2011). Following the imperial conquest that created 
the modern Ethiopian empire in the late 19th century, the narrative of 
depicting culturally, religiously, economically, and politically distinct 
peripheries as backward, violent, wasteland, empty and untamed resources 
became a dominant marker of state-society relations (Markakis 2011:30). 
Such denigration of peripheries reminds us of what Das and Poole 
(2004:19–20) opined on how the state uses different technologies of power 
to ‘manage’ and ‘pacify’ subjects on its margins considered as unruly and 
violent. Through disciplinary and coercive power, successive regimes in 
the country tried to pacify, manage, govern and bring the subjects on the 
margins of the state from the ‘state of nature’ to the ‘state of law’ (Korf et 
al. 2015:886). 
While discussing the federal state and its interests, it is important to 
distinguish between ontological contradictions and geopolitical interests, 
both of which complicate local inter-ethnic relations and efforts at 
peacebuilding in the region. Ontologically, for the federal government that 
inherited the dominant and salient cultural and political identities of the 
centre, governing and subjugating the people in its margins is considered 
as a civilising mission. As a result, it resorts to implementing coercive 
administrative apparatus to incorporate them into the administrative, 
cultural, economic and political logic of the mainstream society. 
Conversely, local communities consider peacebuilding as a holistic process 
in which human-human interaction as well as human-nature relationships 
are governed by cultural values, customs and belief, rather than regulated 
through top-down state administration. Moreover, the government’s 
ethnic-based federal arrangement has been blind to traditional resource 
regulations, coexistence and reciprocity between pastoral communities. 
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It rather disrupted the system by activating territorialisation of space, an 
act contrary to customary resource governance, utilisation and ownership 
rights (Tache and Oba 2009). 
Politically, the federal state seems to have been playing a strategy of 
decentring conf lict and reserving the role of mediator for itself, which gives 
it the leverage to exercise authoritative power. A member of Caffee Oromia 
council – a regional state’s legislative house – powerfully ref lected on the 
federal government’s strategy of playing the Garri and the Borana against 
one another:
The Garri came to this land during the last years of the imperial regime. 
Some of them came during the military period but the majority were 
brought by the current government and resettled on Borana land in 1990s. 
Some came during the referendum in 2004 to add votes for their Garri kin. 
You know what? This Moyale town is located at border between Kenya and 
Ethiopia; and on border between Oromia and Somali regions. I guess the 
government wants to keep this town under its control or at least wants 
to keep it under the control of two competing groups – the two regions. 
It doesn’t trust Oromia because of the OLF, and it doesn’t trust the Somali 
because of the Al-Shabab and also other rebel groups on their side. It is 
an economically important town. All commodities enter via this border 
from Ethiopia to Kenya and vice versa (Anonymous MP, Moyale town, 
August 2015).
The above statement hints at the federal government’s strategy of 
decentring conf lict from the centre, co-opting some groups and weakening 
others. It follows the strategy of strengthening the weak and weakening 
the strong so as to maintain a local power balance. Likewise, scholars have 
also documented how the OLF factor at the Ethiopia-Kenya border has 
inf luenced the government’s administrative approaches at the frontier, 
particularly in sidelining the Borana Oromo’s claims to customary land 
rights and conversely favouring the Somali’s eventual expansion to the 
Borana land over the last two decades (Tache and Oba 2009; Adugna 2009; 
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Bassi 2010). It is in this context that ethnicity is played out and past inter-
ethnic animosities are reactivated in the process of serving the state’s 
political and security interests.  
The Borana zone in general and the Moyale district in particular are 
important in geopolitical and economic terms for the government in Addis 
Ababa especially because of its strategic location on the border with Kenya, 
along the main highway from Addis Ababa to Nairobi. An indication of 
the strategic importance of the area is evident in the establishment of a 
military radar station on the outskirts of Moyale town, which helps the 
regime to monitor liberation movements in the borderlands. Economically, 
the new plan to link the South Sudan-Kenya-Ethiopia pipeline through 
the town of Moyale would make it a major border business hub in the 
country. That is why, according to local sources, the federal government 
does not resolve land claims between the Borana and Somali over the town 
of Moyale. The two regional states also play the OLF factor for different 
purposes. While Oromia national regional state uses the OLF factor as 
instrument for suppressing dissent, the Somali national regional state has 
systematically exploited the national discourse that labels the Borana as 
sympathisers of the OLF in its claim for Borana land as it did during the 
2004 referendum (Tache and Oba 2009; Adugna 2009; Bassi 2010). As a 
result, the conf lict and peacebuilding process in the region has become 
much more complicated. 
Traditional institutions and their co-optation 
While the conf lict can be traced to historical and political dynamics at 
the national level (Oba 2013), it is important to examine how traditional 
institutions of conf lict resolution and peacebuilding were eventually 
reduced and/or how they contributed to the exacerbation of the conf lict. 
The Borana and the Gabra are the groups with an egalitarian and democratic 
system of socio-cultural and political organisation called the Gadaa 
system, which enabled them to sustainably manage their rangeland, coexist 
with other groups and maintain social cohesion within their community 
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(Legesse 1973, 2000; Bassi 2005, 2010). The Gadaa system served as a strong 
institutional basis of inter-group coexistence between these groups and 
their neighbours, most of whom shared similar forms of socio-political 
organisation. Although the Garri do not subscribe to the Gadaa system of 
administration, clan elders played significant roles in conf lict resolution 
within the group and between them and their neighbours (Schlee 2013). 
However, since the last few decades, these traditional institutions have taken 
ethnic lines in creating dichotomies rather than playing the negotiator role, 
building on common values and practices. The political background for 
the divergence of traditional institutions from the role of negotiating for 
social harmony to that of igniting inter-group animosity and differences 
is closely connected to the post-1991 political order in the country and is 
discussed below.
The post-1991 regime in Ethiopia is strongly engaged in a ‘re-traditionalisation’ 
process through which it ambivalently ‘empowers’ traditional institutions 
and at the same time co-opts them into official administrative structures 
(Regassa and Zeleke 2014:49–50). The government resorted to appropriating 
indigenous institutions and co-opting local leaders as instruments of 
broadcasting state authority and ideology to the society via these channels. 
In the case of the Gabra and Borana, for example, local elders from both 
groups asserted the co-optation of Gadaa leaders (Abba Gadaa) into the 
government system, citing instances of these traditional leaders being 
invited to attend government meetings and receiving orders from the 
officials to convince the community to implement government policies 
and programs. A Borana elder from Dirre district commented as follows:
In the past, Gadaa elders governed the people according to Gadaa rules 
and norms. Now, they serve only as mouthpieces of the government. 
They travel to Addis Ababa or Adama, stay in big hotels, are paid per 
diem, stay with big politicians and when they come back to the people, 
they become completely like the government officials. They don’t perform 
according to traditional ways of governance. They talk the same way as 
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the government authorities talk their politics. These Gadaa elders seem to 
have forgotten the fundamental values and principles of the Gadaa system 
(Anonymous elder, Dirre, July 2015).
In line with the above claim, it is important to discern why and how the 
government co-opts traditional institutions and their leaders. During my 
fieldwork, I witnessed the entanglement of the state and these traditional 
institutions, with the former frequently inviting leaders of the Gadaa 
system for ceremonial blessings of public gatherings and festivals but 
without any meaningful engagement. During conf lict resolution practices, 
for example, the government officials decide on how things should be 
handled and hand it over to the traditional leaders only to practise the 
rituals (Regassa 2012b). The government considers the Gadaa elders and 
other traditional institutions as competitive threats to its legitimacy and 
authority. As a result, it does not empower them to the extent where they 
could autonomously deal with important issues like inter-ethnic conf licts.
In connection with government’s appropriation of traditional institutions 
and its co-option of traditional leaders, it is important to discuss how 
this challenges peacebuilding processes. This can be explained in terms 
of the detachment of traditional values, norms and wisdom enhancing 
social harmony, reciprocity and coexistence from practices of conf lict 
resolution. According to local informants from the three groups, ethnicity 
and local politics have changed the perspectives of traditional authorities 
from that of sharing common values and resources to creating dichotomies 
and asserting territoriality. As a result, these traditional leaders and their 
institutions have lost social legitimacy within the society. According to a 
Gabra elder:
In the past, Abba Gadaa lived with the society, respected the culture and 
norms and acted accordingly. Now, the Abba Gadaas, both from Gabra and 
Borana became politicians. They stay with politicians and now forgot what 
our society had in common with others. The same is true for Garri local 
elders. Their clan elders are more or less political appointees. They incline 
to ethnic loyalty rather than working for broader inter-group harmony and 
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coexistence. How can you expect peace between different groups in such 
situation? Politicians talk about difference than similarities. The same is 
true for these traditional leaders (Gabra elder, Moyale district, July 2015).
Borana informants share this view as well; and they opined that the 
fundamental problem militating against ending conf lict and ensuring 
sustainable conf lict resolution and peace formation is the decline in values 
embedded in the Gadaa system following the government’s co-option of 
the institution and its leaders. 
Local communities and their contestations
Ongoing conf licts between the Garri and Borana cannot be understood 
without tracing the historical processes of Somali expansion to Borana land 
and how political dynamics at the national level have continuously shaped 
their relationship. While the three groups had locally well-defined and 
mutually recognised territories even before colonial conquest in Kenya and 
Ethiopia, territories and resources within them were f lexibly negotiated on 
the basis of customary institutions and forms of reciprocity (Bassi 2010). 
However, by systematically creating allegiance to the British colonial 
rulers in northern Kenya and the Ethiopian imperial regime, the Garri 
successfully pushed the Borana further west, claiming pasture and water 
grounds in the Dirre and Dillo districts. Although the Garri’s alignment to 
the Somalia irredentist group during the 1977/78 Ethio-Somalia war had 
temporarily made them subject to the military regime’s punitive actions, 
the post-1991 political change has shifted the game once again in favour of 
the Garri in their territorial claims of Borana land. 
Conversely, the districts Moyale, Dirre and Liban where the Garri partly 
inhabit had historical, cultural and economic significances for the Borana 
Oromo because it was where Borana ancestors lived, practised rituals, 
grazed their livestock and dug deep wells for their livestock. These districts 
were among the best rangelands in the Borana zone, and the Garri and 
Gabra from both Ethiopia and Kenya got unrestricted access to its resources 
in the past through mutual negotiations (Oba 2013). For the three groups, 
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the connection between space, identity and resource, following the ethnic 
based federal arrangement, has become more contentious. As people whose 
culture is physically constituted and intertwined with their livelihood 
practices, access to a certain territory or lack of it hints at issues of identity, 
territoriality and culture, and this goes beyond existential livelihood 
concerns.
From the Garri’s perspective too, the territorial claim has historical and 
economic (resource) reasons. The districts mentioned earlier where the 
Garri recently gained control are among the best rangelands compared to 
the arid and fragile districts in the eastern part of Somali national regional 
state. They trace their settlement in the Borana land to past historical 
phenomena for which the current generation would not be accounted. 
The Gabra on their part also have some claims of entitlement and concerns of 
being unequally treated under the Borana zone on the one hand and pushed 
by the Somalis on the other. According to Gabra elders, their numerical 
minority and their settlement between the Somalis and the Borana have 
put them on the disadvantageous side whenever conf licts arise between 
them and their neighbours. It is such conf licting claims of entitlement 
with historical, cultural, identity and economic attachments that instigate 
inter-group conf licts in the region. Therefore, territorialisation of 
pastoral frontiers into ethnically demarcated boundaries has changed the 
perception of people about resource, its utilisation and ownership vis-à-vis 
their rival ‘others’. This makes the perceived or real condition of scarcity 
a potent rallying point for conf lict although resource scarcity per se is not 
the underlying cause of conf lict. 
As part of local communities, but more specifically at the level of individual 
actors, the role of ethnic entrepreneurs – state representatives, smugglers 
and cattle raiders – in complicating conf lict situations in the region should 
not be underestimated. As Migdal (2001) noted, we cannot plainly discern 
between the state and society as both are entangled into one another, and 
thus the state operates its agenda through its local agents who play double 
subjectivities. These individuals resort to ethnic repertoires to mobilise 
members of their group to their interest, usually for individual benefits and 
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at times to serve the interests of the state. In the local political landscape, 
there is an evident rift within the Borana and Gabra. During elections, 
local politicians emphasise the apparent differences between the groups, 
thus using society forces to mask their pursuit of private political interests. 
From an economic dimension, the border town of Moyale is a hotspot 
and major hub for cross-border illegal and informal trade. In fact, this 
statement alludes to a wider perspective on the nature of borders in Africa, 
and how borders generally have been zones of anonymity and clandestine 
business (Adugna 2009; Korf and Raeymaekers 2013:9). The presence of 
the Borana, Gabra and Garri on both sides of the border enhances easy 
manoeuvring of the traders using their respective kin as reliable agents 
in the process. Traders activate the use of kinship networks to engage in 
informal and illegal activities such as contraband trade and cattle rustling. 
While this makes the border an economic resource, there are cases where 
individual smugglers blame members of rival groups when their goods get 
confiscated by custom controllers and this sometimes leads to conf lict. 
In situations where ethnic dichotomies are polarised, inter-personal 
conf licts are easily translated into inter-ethnic conf licts. 
Cattle rustling has been common practices among pastoral communities 
in eastern Africa since the pre-colonial period (Gray et al. 2003). Cattle 
rustling is located within cultural and social dimensions as it gives the 
raiders the prerogative to demonstrate their capability, power and bravery 
both in the eyes of their victims as well as within their own communities. 
Cattle theft on its part is currently practised for the economic interests 
of individuals and as reprisal against any conf lict or previous rustling/
theft from a rival group. Cattle raiding is not a common cause of conf lict 
in the study area, but it is practised after conf licts have begun. It is a 
common practice, which government authorities, NGOs and local elders 
have not been successful in eradicating. According to oral reports during 
the workshop organised by the Oromia Pastoralist Association (OPA) in 
August 2015, cattle theft is common on both the Ethiopian and Kenyan 
sides. A central difficulty in solving this problem is the fact that once 
thieves take stolen cattle to their villages, no resident will expose their 
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presence. The politicisation of ethnic differences, the decline of traditional 
institutions and the prevalence of recurrent conf licts have weakened old 
values of reciprocity and coexistence, and conversely enhanced antagonism 
and the covering up of morally unacceptable practices such as theft. 
NGOs and their powerlessness
Another challenge to peacebuilding processes is related to the government’s 
closer scrutiny and co-option of NGOs engaged in conf lict resolution. 
Following the promulgation of ‘Charities and Societies Proclamation 
No.621/2009’ in 2009, the activities, areas of engagements and autonomy 
of Civil Society Organisations have been significantly restricted. This was 
done by mandating them to be registered under an agency governed by 
the federal government, placing a restriction on budget solicitation from 
abroad, and putting their jobs under strict scrutiny whether there is a 
political element to it or not.   
To illustrate this clearly, a brief outline of the activities of an NGO called 
Oromia Pastoralist Association (OPA) that operates on peacebuilding 
activities in the region is informative here. I had the opportunity to 
attend a ‘Peace Committee Follow-up Meeting’ organised by OPA on 
21 and 22 August 2015 in Yabelo town, Borana zone. The participants 
came from eight districts in Borana zone and each team presented security 
problems and peacebuilding activities they have been engaged in during 
the previous months. Out of six members from each district, four were 
government authorities at the district level while the remaining two were 
from local elders. Following the usual blessing by elders, an opening 
speech was delivered by the head of Security and Administration office of 
Borana zone. This highly placed official emphasised problems related to 
inter-group conf licts between the Borana and their neighbours including 
those from northern Kenya. The government official also talked about the 
challenges of maintaining peace and tried to blame local communities and 
individuals, whom he labelled as ‘anti-peace groups’, for prioritising their 
interests rather than working on peacebuilding for the communities. It was 
within this context that the discussion was started.
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During the presentation and discussions, it became clear that most of the 
participants very cautiously ref lected the complicity of the state in the 
conf lict or as a challenge to the peacebuilding process. However, workshop 
conveners from OPA were careful not to allow discussion which might 
place incriminating responsibility on the government. In one instance, 
one of the participants from the local elders strongly raised points on the 
involvement of the government as one of the challenges but the workshop 
leader interrupted and suggested that the focus should be on any weakness 
of the committee or the society.
Thus, whereas NGOs rhetorically claim to be bridging the gap between 
government and society, in practice they align with government approaches, 
giving little or no focus to traditional mechanisms of conf lict resolution. 
In this regard, even though OPA tries to transcend ethnic boundaries 
in bringing elders together for dialogue on causes, consequences and 
solutions to conf licts, it is strongly associated to the state. Inversely, it tries 
to maintain its legitimacy and credibility by focusing on the rhetoric of 
dialogue and cross-border relations unlike the government that emphasises 
structural approaches and ethnic boundaries. OPA does not however 
provide alternative approaches to ensure sustainable peacebuilding. Local 
communities also do not recognise OPA as a neutral NGO that could 
impartially and autonomously work on peace and conf lict resolution. 
Conclusion
Conf lict in the region has many causes, and often involves various ethnic 
groups on both sides of the Ethiopia-Kenya border as well as other actors. In 
a nutshell, two interconnected issues complicate the conf lict dynamics and 
peacebuilding process, and remain the bottlenecks for understanding the 
inter-group conf licts in the region. First, the involvement of multi-layered 
actors with competing interests and the persistence of multi-dimensional 
causal factors of conf licts remain the major challenges. Second, conf lict 
resolution and peacebuilding practices in the region have been crammed 
with competing orders and perspectives on the side of actors involved. 
This paper found that although resources remain fundamental for 
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pastoralist livelihoods, and access or restriction to resources determines 
not only wealth but also socio-political dynamics in such contexts, conf lict 
in the region is much more complex than the dominant narrative of 
resource scarcity. In the post-1991 period in Ethiopia, common resource 
areas have been territorialised according to ethno-linguistic lines, which 
created barriers to customary resource bases such as rangeland and water 
points that were in the past mutually utilised. Since territorial control 
enhances political power and economic interest of rival groups, the conflict 
can then be understood from a political ecology perspective as it proposes 
causal links to power relations and contestations over territories for socio-
economic, political and ecological reasons. Geopolitical and economic 
interests of the state over the borderland have also complicated conf licts 
because the federal government uses contestations between the Borana and 
Somali as a strategic approach to maintain a power balance between the 
two rival groups and in turn uses them as a security strategy against rebel 
movements from both sides.
This paper calls for the government to refrain from utilising decentring 
of conf lict and differentially treating citizens as strategies for its security 
and political control. Rather, as an active constitutive of state power, the 
government should empower traditional institutions and respect their 
values and autonomy so that they might practise conf lict resolution to 
complement the state’s peace building practices. 
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